omp packages

@otixe/pi-plan-gate0.1.0

Make plan-first requests stick with acknowledged plans and a traceable human approval workflow

otixe Published 7 days ago MIT ~300 downloads/mo

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Readme

@otixe/pi-plan-gate

“Please plan first” gets forgotten as soon as implementation starts. Give the plan a durable checkpoint and a named human approver: propose the work, wait for review, then execute the accepted plan.

Español · MIT

Problems it removes

  • Plans lost on reload → remotely acknowledged state restoration.
  • Implementation beginning before review → planning/awaiting blocks for edit/write and delegation.
  • Unclear approval provenance → matching owner ACK and configured human review activity.

Plan-first requests become traceable human review

Install in one command

From a reviewed local checkout:

pi install ./packages/pi-plan-gate

Configuration and backend

Set PLAN_GATE_BASE_URL, PLAN_GATE_AGENT, PLAN_GATE_KEY_ENV (default PLAN_GATE_KEY) and export that credential variable. Optional: PLAN_GATE_AUTH_HEADER=X-API-Key, PLAN_GATE_APPROVER=human, PLAN_GATE_ROOT, PLAN_GATE_READONLY_AGENTS (JSON array, default []). Keys are environment-only; office/delegate principals fail closed.

The compatible backend must provide agent checkpoint save/latest plus /task/create, /task/claim, /task/update, /task/submit, /task/get, /task/activity, /task/comment, preserving owner attribution and review activity. State uses session_ref=plan-gate; only configured human pass/needs_changes reviews count. Failed ACK leaves the previous phase unchanged.

Tools: plan_mode, plan_submit, plan_check; command /plan. No URL means idle/inactive: you cannot enter planning without durable ACK. /plan off is a workflow override requiring remote confirmation, not a permission bypass.

Planning/awaiting block edit/write and unapproved subagents. Read the shell and restore-failure boundaries in Security & limits before relying on this workflow.

Validation and rollback

To remove, pi remove SOURCE, then reload/restart your test session; preserve logs, snapshots and sessions.

Full monorepo configuration and reproducible validation: README, VALIDATION.

Security & limits

bash and bg_run remain available and logged; other tools are not a complete write detector. Shell can write files. This is a workflow gate, not a security/read-only sandbox. Logs may include command paths/secrets; inspect before sharing. Restore failure is visible but leaves idle: it does not establish protection.

Validated on Pi 1.4.0; the five host packages are peerDependencies "*", never bundled copies. Wildcard peers do not promise every host version. Review source/trust before installation: extensions run with process permissions. Tests use model/backend doubles and do not certify production authentication.

For local archives, extract the tarball and install its package directory: Pi 1.4.0 does not load .tgz extension sources even when pi install succeeds. The literal install exits 0; print/load exits 1. The monorepo README shows the supported extraction command.

Registry installation uses pi install npm:@otixe/pi-plan-gate@0.1.0 once the publisher releases that version. npm sources and repository/gallery URLs require separately authorized publication; a local checkout does not make them available.